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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper addresses the question of why the student loan crisis has arisen through the use of a 
demand and supply model.  The model serves as a framework for analyzing the student-borrower 
motivations (the demand side), the bank-lender motivations (the supply side), externalities that 
motivate government support for student loans, and the perverse incentives government 
regulations spawn for educational institutions and lenders.  Analysis of the model reveals that the 
crisis is driven by students’ desire to increase their socioeconomic standing, by banks’ search for 
profits in a climate of decreasing risk, and by the government’s efforts to lessen the impact of 
externalities.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
he soaring volume of student loans and their default rates have raised the question, “why has this 
student loan crisis arisen?”  This paper answers the question by using the demand and supply model 
as the framework for drawing together four separate strands of inquiry found in the literature into one 
focused analysis.   
 
 Subsequent sections of this paper recount the arguments of Razaki et al. (2014) that affect the demand by 
students for loans; discuss the context of the student loan market, in particular the externalities involved and the 
resulting government action; draw on the bank-lending literature of Alonzi et al. (1980, 1983, 2010, and 2011) that 
was developed prior to the student loan crisis and is now being applied to the supply side of the student loan market; 
draw these strands together in a demand and supply analysis to explain the surge in student loan volume contributing 
to the student loan crisis; and provide two policy recommendations.  
 
Demand By Students For Loans 
 
 The work by Razaki et al. (2014) reveals a reason for the very strong demand by students and their families 
for student loans. They point out that for decades people have found that education “provides ‘the chance to move a 
person from one socio-economic level to another to open doors’” that are otherwise closed to them. The acquisition 
of education can lead to a more prosperous future, but without an education, a person may be relegated forever to a 
poorer future. The view of Razaki et al. (2014) is supported by a recent Pew Foundation (2014) study.  The Pew 
Foundation reported that persons with a bachelor’s degree, on average, earn $45,500, have a 3.8% unemployment 
rate and a 5.0% poverty rate, while the corresponding numbers for persons with a two-year degree are $33,000, 
8.1% and 14.7%; and for a high school graduate, they are $28,000, 12.82%, and 21.8%, respectively.  So the student 
loan is, as Razaki et al. (2014) put it, the way “to seize the opportunity to have a chance for a better life… from this 
perspective, the payoff to student loan debt, though uncertain, dwarfs the risk in the minds of parents wishing only a 
better life for their children.”   
T 
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 From this argument of Razaki et al. (2014), the authors draw the implication that the demand for student 
loans was very strong due to the dream to move up in socio-economic order.   
 
Government Action In Student Loan Market: Context For Demand And Supply 
 
Externalities And Government Student Loan Guarantees 
 
 Education, in general, and higher education, in particular, benefit society beyond the benefits accruing 
privately to the individual receiving the education. Essentially, it can be surmised that, on average, individuals with 
a college degree bring to their decision-making a greater depth and breadth of exposure to the philosophical verities 
of life as well as the concepts and skills of the high tech information age. Further, such individuals may better 
comprehend the complexity of the interrelationships of those philosophical verities as well as the technical concepts 
and skills and their application than do those with less formal education. Thus, educated individuals, on average, 
tend to be more able to live an effective life suited not only to the employment needs of the high tech/information 
age but also to the needs of every day human experience.  Complementing these phenomena is the university 
curricula’s focus on critical thinking and problem-solving skills used by those in business, science, government and 
the law to the benefit of ALL citizens.   
 
 The benefits of better decision-making accrue not only to the private individual making the decision but 
also spill over to the economy as a whole.  These external benefits are unlikely to be fully reflected in the salaries 
that graduates earn. Thus, the markets for these skills miss the benefits external to the private decisions of 
demanders and suppliers of education.  Neglecting these external social benefits leads to a lower quantity of 
educational services chosen than would be the case if all the external benefits of education had been incorporated in 
the decision process.  Society is denied the benefits of a more educated populace because it undervalues education.  
Consequently, many with the potential to raise their standard of living are denied the opportunity to drive positive 
change and, instead, are relegated to a lower standard of living. This, in turn, causes society to miss out on the 
benefits of a more highly educated populace, and society as a whole suffers from this slight. 
 
 Government action guaranteeing student loans can raise the number of those receiving a higher education 
so that the optimal number of people (societal cost vs. societal benefit) are able to pursue a college degree. This will 
raise the standard of living for everyone and so should be a priority of both the federal and local governments.  
 
 Compounding the challenge of missing the external benefits of education due to the presence of 
externalities is the recent decline in the private incentive to the individual to attend college.  The private incentive is 
falling due to the rising cost to the individual attending college.  According to the National Center for Education 
Statistics (2013), the cost of tuition and room and board at US public universities has increased by 124% between 
1981 and 2011, while that for private universities has increased by 129%. During this same period of time, 
according to the Office of Financial Management, US per capita personal income has increased by 72%. This 
suggests the private return to the US college graduates of a college education is falling.  While this falling private 
incentive to the individual to attend college now confronts students and their parents, the return to a college 
education was higher than (and the authors believe, even today, remains higher) the return on an associate’s degree 
or high school diploma during the high growth years of student loan volume analyzed in this paper.   
 
Government Action Affecting Risk And Return Of Student Loan Debt 
 
 Implementation of the federal government support in the student loan market can be found in the Higher 
Education Act of 1965 and, in particular, the Federal Family Education Loan Program (FFELP).  The specific 
structure created in the Federal Family Education Loan Program (FFELP) provided perverse incentives significantly 
impacting the student loan market that were eliminated in 2010.   
 
 The aptly named Student Aid and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 2009 (SAFRA) [H. R. 3221 2010] was 
added to the Reconciliation Act of 2010 which, in turn, was tacked onto the Patient Protection and Affordable Care 
Act that became law in March of 2010. The law was intended as a way to remove the federal government from the 
practice of subsidizing private student loans and, in doing so, make substantial cuts to the federal deficit.  
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 One of the driving forces behind this legislation occurred in 2007 when New York Attorney General 
Andrew Cuomo exposed corruption between financial firms lending to students and the colleges they attended. AG 
Cuomo found evidence that lenders had been buying off college loan officials to steer students in their direction 
when seeking money for school. According to the attorney general, as quoted in USA Today (2007), during the 
investigation they “found numerous arrangements that benefited schools and lenders at the expense of students”.  At 
the time, the federal government was subsidizing private student loans through the Federal Family Education Loan 
Program (FFELP) and, through that program, was funding over 80 percent of the student loans in this country, as 
noted by Brown (2010).  
 
 The government subsidy of the loans created a perverse incentive for private lenders to increase the risk in 
their loan portfolio. Under the FFELP, banks were able to game the system to the extent that the lenders actually 
profited more when students defaulted than when they were able to pay the loans back in full. Delinquent loans were 
turned over to a guaranty agency whose job it was to keep students caught up on the repayment schedule. For efforts 
made prior to default, guaranty agencies earned just one percent of the loan's outstanding balance. However, once 
the loan defaults and the agency regenerates it, the guarantor earns as much as 38.5% of the loan's balance, as noted 
by Brown (2010). Collection efforts were also much more profitable than efforts to avoid default, which gave 
guaranty agencies a major incentive to encourage delinquencies. These circumstances motivated lenders to avoid 
working with borrowers in order to encourage them to go into default; 60.5% of federal payments to FFELP in 2008 
came from defaults as noted by Brown (2010).  
 
 Private lenders were, in effect, able to decouple the risks associated with student loans from their returns, 
leading to what Brown (2010) calls “an unwarranted form of welfare to a privileged financier class at the expense of 
struggling students”. This situation arose due to the government subsidy, which made risky loans more valuable than 
low risk loans.  
 
 Under SAFRA, private lenders may no longer originate federal loans for students attending schools that are 
affiliated with the FFELP. This terminates the government subsidy of private loans. In addition, rates for Direct 
Loans under SAFRA are variable and are calculated as the effective annual rate on 91-day Treasury bills plus 2.5%. 
These rates are typically adjusted every three to six months. Further, SAFRA sets a cap of 6.8% on these 
government loans. Private lenders have, to date, been unwilling to set any sort of cap on student loan rates. This is 
evidence that the banking industry believes they are justified in earning higher returns than the taxpayers while 
taking on less risk.  
 
 Private lenders typically have their variable student loan rates tied to either the federal funds rate or the 
LIBOR (plus a margin). This is also intended to protect the lenders’ margin above their cost of borrowing. As 
discussed above, private lenders do not have a cap on interest rates at this time. Their margins are not limited to the 
2.5% offered by the federal rates. Structuring the rates this way is intended to guarantee the government a return of 
2.5% above what they pay for the short-term debt they issue, except during periods of very high interest rates (the 
yield on 91-day T-bills would have to exceed 4.3% for the cap to erode the loans’ margin). 
 
Supply By Lenders Of Student Loans 
 
 In several papers, Alonzi et al. (1980, 1983, 2010, 2011) have developed bank models to study the effects 
on bank lending decisions of deposit withdrawal risk, loan interest rate risk, and loan default risk.  These models 
incorporate the interaction of time, bank-owner risk attitude, and uncertainties, including lending interest-rate 
uncertainty, deposit-flow uncertainty, and loan-repayment uncertainty.  The analysis of these models provides 
consistent, similar closed form solutions for the bank lending decision with very intuitive explanations of bank 
lending rooted in the combined influence of these factors.  However, none of the analyses of these models explicitly 
consider bank lending in the student loan market. 
 
 Returning to these solutions in light of the current student loan crisis and with a slight reinterpretation, they 
provide insight regarding the role of lender decision in the current crisis.  Essentially, it seems reasonable to hold 
that the willingness of banks to make student loans was encouraged by a lessening degree of lender risk aversion 
during the frothy years leading up to the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September of 2008.  This willingness to 
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lend due to lessening risk aversion was reinforced by the reduced default risk faced by lenders due to changes in the 
laws (Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 and 2005 Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act), 
striking student loans from the list of items eligible for discharge in bankruptcy.   
 
 The models referred to above all consider the decisions of a perfectly competitive bank in lending markets.  
The bank owner is either one who exhibits constant absolute risk aversion, faces random variables that are 
uncorrelated, identically and normally distributed, and decides in an explicitly multi-period context or one who is 
risk neutral facing uncorrelated random variables making decisions in mono-period context.   
 
 Regardless of which particular model’s result is considered, all the bank lending solutions reveal the effects 
on lending of the net interest return from lending, of discounting to account for the different timing of cash flows, 
and of the variability of the random variables.  In a highly stylized form, the common closed form solution has the 
following basic structure:
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This closed form solution shows the effects of uncertain loan repayment     , bank borrowing cost 
          , and risk attitude   on bank lending  
  .  Specifically, direct inspection reveals that bank lending is 
directly related to the expected loan repayment interest rate on loans      while inversely related to bank borrowing 
costs            as well as the banker’s degree of risk attitude   and the variance of the proportion of student loans 
repaying as agreed      .  
 
 The understanding of this closed form solution is enhanced by viewing it from another point of view which 
breaks the solution of L* into the product of two parts - the incentive for one dollar of lending and a scaling factor: 
 
L* = [  rL - rD] / [γb2σ
2
(l)] = { [  rL - rD] / b2 } times { 1 / [ γσ
2
(l) ] } [2] 
 
 The first part, [  rL - rD] / b2, is the present value of the expected interest rate spread to be earned on one 
dollar of lending and thus, it is the lender’s incentive to engage in lending operations.  The second part, 1 / γσ2(l), is 
the number of times one would want to replicate, and so, earn the first part.  It is a scaling factor. This second part is 
determined by the interplay between the amount of risk represented by the variance of the loans repaying as agreed 
                                                 
1 In particular, see Alonzi and Hutchinson (1983) Equation (4) on page 1046 and Alonzi (1980) Equation (9) on page 30. Note in the case of a 
risk neutral banker, the   does not enter the solution but the rising cost of deposit funding, due to rising bank size, does.  Here in [1], the choice 
was made to indicate the affect of risk attitude rather than the rising cost of deposit funding as bank size increases. 
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and the degree of the lender’s risk aversion represented by gamma, γ (γ is the Arrow-Pratt coefficient of absolute 
risk aversion which indicates risk aversion for any gamma greater than zero.  The larger the gamma, the greater is 
the risk aversion; while the smaller, the less the risk aversion.) 
 
 Intuitively, the two parts of the rewritten solution for L* reveal that the amount one would lend today 
depends upon the incentive for one dollar of lending (discounted expected interest rate spread), [  rL - rD] / b2, 
amplified by the scaling factor, 1 / γσ2(l), which is the number of times one would want to earn that incentive.     
 
 Note that, ceteris paribus, the smaller the gamma, the less risk averse the lender, and so the larger the 
scaling factor which, in turn, leads to a larger amount of total lending L*.  In the extreme case of gamma equal to 
zero, the lender would be risk neutral and L* would be infinite (stated, more precisely, as gamma goes to zero, the 
scaling factor goes to infinity, and with it, L*).  Essentially, if one is truly risk neutral, then the incentive provided 
by earning an expected positive spread   rL  > rD  is so strong that the lender wants to do as much L* as possible.   
 
Viewed in light of the student loan crisis with L* representing student loans, two key insights emerge.  
First, during the frothy years preceding 2008, it is reasonable to think that bankers (or the managers retained by the 
bank owners)
2 
might have become less risk averse.  A reduction in risk aversion reduces   which, in turn, increases 
lending L* to students.  This contributes to the explanation of the increased student loans by showing the increased 
willingness of lenders to make student loans as illustrated below. 
 
 The second insight is found by examining the effect of the variance of the proportion of student loans 
repaying as agreed,      .  With the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 removing government guaranteed student 
loans from the list of assets dischargeable in bankruptcy, reinforced by the 2005 Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and 
Consumer Protection Act (Pub L. No. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23), removing even private (non-government guaranteed) 
student loans from the list of assets dischargeable in bankruptcy, the variance of the proportion of student loans 
repaying as agreed       falls precipitously, if not to zero.  Notably, as the denominator of L*’s closed form 
solution approaches zero, L* soars.  Essentially, the institutional changes made regarding the eligibility of student 
loans for discharge via bankruptcy contributed greatly to bank willingness to make student loans.   
 
CONCLUSION AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
 The effects of the strands discussed above are combined and illustrated by the demand and supply 
framework presented in Figure 1.  The demand for student loans has the usual negative slope.  Notably, it is very 
large relative to supply due to students seizing the chance to move from one socio-economic level to another, which 
is supported by government subsidization of student borrowing.  With the government setting an interest rate ceiling 
on student loan rates at Ceiling i below the equilibrium rate, the increase in bank sector lending leads to a dramatic 
increase in student loans from QE to QZ in Figure 1.  In part, this increase in bank lending is due to less risk-averse 
(i.e., lower γ in Equation [1] model) owners or their managers and, in part, due to less risk (i.e., lower       
resulting from student loans’ non-dischargeability in bankruptcy).  Notably, the falling σ (the variability of loan 
repayment falls as loans are more likely to be repaid as agreed) raises bank lending for the prudent bank as well as 
for the profligate bank whose   falls as the profligate manager’s low   replaces the bank owner’s high   – the 
agency issue noted in footnote 2.  This increase in student loan dollars shifts the supply curve to the right, resulting 
in a big bulge in student loans QE to QZ. That is, the student loan crisis arises as the confluence of the strands 
discussed above: 1) strong demand for loans by students seizing her/his dream of improving her/his socioeconomic 
standing with 2) the support of government subsidies, and 3) the increased appetite of banks to make student loans 
due to government reducing the risk associated with lending by guaranteeing student loans and disallowing the 
discharge of student loans in bankruptcy.  
  
                                                 
2 This is the agency issue explored in Alonzi, Peter, Robert Irons, and Khalid Razaki (2010) and in Alonzi, Loreto Peter, Michael Hunstad, and 
Robert Irons (2011). 
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Figure 1:  Interest Rate On Government Guaranteed Student Loan 
 
 These results lead to policy recommendations in two broad areas: policies that apply to 1) lenders and 2) 
borrowers. 
 
 For Lenders, given that student loans are no longer dischargeable in bankruptcy, the risk associated with 
student loans is reduced. This fact justifies requiring private lenders to treat student loans differently than other 
loans. To start with, there should be a cap on the rates private lenders can charge for student loans. Private lenders 
now have limited risk due to the changes in the bankruptcy laws and, therefore, a limited return is not out of line. 
 
 On the front end, lenders should be required to establish the borrower’s creditworthiness and/or require co-
signers on the loan or they should be held partially liable for contributing to the probability of default through poor 
due diligence. Similar to the legal concept of contributory negligence, this would motivate lenders to take the time 
and expense to investigate the borrower properly or allow student borrowers some recourse when they fail to do so.  
 
 On the back end, lenders should be required to offer options to potential defaulters that would permit them 
to deal with their difficult situations in order to get them back on track once the difficult circumstances are resolved. 
Deferring and forbearance, as offered by the government, should be offered and encouraged rather than pushing for 
default.  
 
 For students, student borrowers should have the ability to discharge student loans in bankruptcy court under 
extreme conditions. This would still offer reduced risk to lenders while not destroying student borrowers’ lives. 
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